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I consider an economy in which a fraction of contracts is renegotiated each period. In
the spirit of Fischer (1977) and in contrast to Taylor (1979, 1980), Calvo (1983), and
Fuhrer and Moore (1992, 1995a,b), contracts specify a price path rather thana fixed
price level. The aggregate price adjustment rule derived from these assumptions is an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve with a built in "speed" or "Lipsey Loop" effect.
The rule is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis and implies that disinflations are
unambiguously contractionary. When supplemented with a specification of aggregate
demand, the model can be used to find the money-supply path required to achieve a
given desired path of the aggregate price level. Alternatively, the model can be used to
find the aggregate-price-Ievel path implied by a given monetary policy. Policy-induced
recessions can be quite persistent even when contracts are renegotiated frequently. For
realistic parameter values, the model generates a liquidity effect: disinflations are
initially accompanied by a rising short-term interest rate and a declining money supply.Introduction
Calvo (1983) presents an elegant reformulation of the Taylor (1979, 1980) model
of overlapping contracts. Like Taylor, Calvo assumes that each firm's price is fixed over
the life of its contract, and that the contract price is a function of the expected future
aggregate price level and expected future excess demand. Realism is added by dropping
the assumption that contracts are all of the same length, in favor of an exponential
distribution of expiration dates. An attractive feature of the Calvo model is that by
varying the mean rate at which contracts come up for renewal one can easily move from
an economy in which the price level is almost completely rigid to an economy in which
the price level is almost completely flexible.'
Although the assumptions that underlie it are plausible and its simplicity is
appealing, Calvo's price adjustment model has two undesirable properties. First, the
model implies that policy makers can keep output permanently above its market-dearing
level--an implication inconsistent with the natural-rate hypothesis. Second, the model
implies that even sudden, surprise disinflations can be achieved at zero cost in terms of
foregone output. Indeed, disinflation may be accompanied by a boom (Phelps 1978, Ball
1991). To many, this implication seems unrealistic.
Recent attempts to develop a more satisfactory model of aggregate price
adjustment have resolved one or the other--but not both--of the problems affecting the
Calvo model. McCallum (1980, 1994) has championed a price adjustment rule that
allows perfect flexibility of the inflation rate while prohibiting jumps in the price level.'
The McCallum rule is consistent with the natural-rate hypothesis, but remains subject to
the criticism that it allows immediate, zero-cost reductions in inflation. Fuhrer and
Moore (1992, 1995a,b) develop a variant of the Calvo model in which the change in the
1 For interesting applications, see Yun (1994) and Kimball (1995). Woodford (1995,
pp. 1281-4) discusses the advantages of this general approach. A more complicated
alternative approach is to split the economy into flexible price and sticky price sectors,
and then analyze how the economy's performance depends on the size of the sticky-price
sector relative to the flexible-price sector (Ohanian, Stockman, and Kilian 1995).
, The rule was initially proposed by Grossman (1974). Also see Barro and
Grossman (1976), Mussa (1981a,b) and--for a critique of Mussa's analysis--Rotemberg
(1983).new-contract price depends upon expected future aggregate price inflation. Disinflations
are always costly in the Fuhrer-Moore model. More generally, the model does a good
job of matching the short-run dynamics of real-world inflation and output. However, like
the Calvo model, the Fuhrer-Moore model is inconsistent with the long-run neutrality of
money. Moreover, the intuition underlying the Fuhrer-Moore model is fuzzy, at best.
In the model presented here, inflation is more flexible than in the Calvo and
Fuhrer-Moore models, but not as flexible as in the McCallum model. Like Calvo and
Fuhrer-Moore, I assume overlapping contracts, with an exponential distribution of
contract lengths. However, much as in Fischer (1977), each contract specifies a path of
prices rather than a fIXed price leveL' The result is an aggregate price adjustment
equation that looks like an expectations-augmented Phillips curve with a built in "speed"
or ';Lipsey Loop" effect.' The long-run Phillips curve is vertical: monetary policy cannot
keep output permanently above its market-cleating level. .Moreover--because the
. expectations that are relevant to aggregate price adjustment respond sluggishly to new
information--disinflations that are not fully anticipated are inevitably associated with
recessions.
Two main criticisms have been directed at Fischer contracts.' The first criticism is
that Fischer-style price-setting is·seldom obserVed in practice, except in multi-year union
labor contracts. However, it may be that manyfirms without formal Fischercstyle
contracts follow procedures that have much the same effect. For example, it is common
for non-unionized firms to conduct pay surveys every few years, to gauge whether and to
, Yun (1994) also looks at Fischer-style contracts. However, he assumes the contract
:..renegotiationsare distributed uniformly over a finite interval rather than exponentially.
Yun focusses most of his attention on the Calvo model. The McCallum model is not
included in his analysis.
, This effect is the tendency for inflation to be higher in periods during which output
is growing rapidly relative to capacity than in periods during which output is growing
slowly, taking inflation expectations and the level of output-market slack as given. The
speed effect was noted by Phillips (1958) in his original analysis of the relationship
between unemployment and the growth rate of wages. Lipsey (1960) proposed an
explanation for the speed effect. However, Smyth (1979) casts doubt on lipsey's story.
5 See, for example, Woodford (1995).what extent their wages are out of line with the wages offered by competitors. Between
surveys, firms' wages are not typically constant. Insofar each firm's wage path depends
primarily upon information available at the time of its most recent pay survey, the
Fischer model may accurately describe aggregate wage dynamics. More generally, the
frequency with which firms change their prices is likely to exceed the frequency with
which firms reevaluate the competitiveness of those prices whenever the direct costs of
price changes (so-called "menu costs") are small relative to the costs of renegotiating
contracts or gathering information on market conditions.
The second main criticism of Fischer contracts is that they imply too brief an
output response to monetary shocks. This criticism takes it for granted that firms whose
price contracts are up for renegotiation will move directly to the expected market-
clearing price path. There are good reasons to believe that firms will, instead, typically
move to a price path that is intermediate between the expected market-clearing and
expected average price paths. When Fischer's contracting model is generalized to allow
for this possibility, the economy's adjustment to shocks can be considerably delayed.
The paper begins with a review of the Calvo, McCallum, and Fuhrer-Moore price-
adjustment models. Next, I discuss the aggregate price dynamics of an economy in which
contracts specify a price path rather than a fixed price level. Finally, I illustrate the
response of this economy to disinflationary policy using a simple model of aggregate
demand. Important quantitative and qualitative differences in the behavior of output,
interest rates, and the demand for money are observed, depending upon the sensitivity of
the contract price to output market disequilibrium and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Simulations show that monetary-policy-induced fluctuations in output can
be quite persistent even when contracts are renegotiated frequently. For realistic
parameter values, disinflations are initially accompanied by rising interest rates and a
declining money supply.
3Existing Price Adjustment Models
The Calvo Model. Suppose that there is a large number of otherwise identical firms
whose output prices are fixed in overlapping contracts. Over any small interval, IJ., of
time there is probability81J. that a given contract will expire, where 8 > O. The (log of
the) new-contract price is a function of expected market conditions over the life of the
contract. In particular, if v, is the (log of the) price level fixed at time t by a firm that




is the aggregate price level at time t, E.( .) is the mathematical expectation conditional
on information available at time t, and B > 0 is a fixed parameter. The variable z, is a
measure of market disequilibrium--either the gap, y, - y*" between actual output and
market-clearing output (Calvo 1983, McCallum 1980, 1994) or, alternatively, the gap, p*,
- p" between an appropriately defined market-clearing price and the actual price
(Grossman 1974, Barro and Grossman 1976, Mussa 1981a,b). The price gap formulation
is more general, but also more ambiguous: In any case, the intuition is that firms will
6 Whether a particular price level is "market clearing" or not will depend upon
expected future monetary policy and upon how "monetary policy" is defined. For
example, the price level that is market clearing given the current level and expected
future path of the money supply will not typically be the same as the price level that is
market clearing given the current level and expected future path of nominal spending. If
the latter definition of p* is adopted, the price-gap and output-gap measures of
4want to charge more than the aggregate price if the aggregate price leaves excess
demand for output aod to charge less thao the aggregate price if the aggregate price
results in excess supply.' When is = 1 and z = p* - p, v equals the average (over the life
of the contract) of the expected market-clearing price level.
Note that although the arrival of new information can cause v, to jump at time t,
the aggregate price level, p" is necessarily continuous.
Let 7T denote the aggregate inflation rate. Differentiation of equation 2 yields 7T,
= 8(v, - p,). But, from equation 1, vt = 11 (vt - p t ) - 11 ~ Z t at all times, t, when no




absent new information. Equation 3 says that current inflation depends not only upon
current slack in the output market, but also the rate of chaoge of a weighted average of
expected future prices aod expected future slack. Equation 4 says that aoticipated
declines in inflation are associated with excess demaod for output (alternatively, with a
price level that is below its market-clearing value). An immediate implication is that
policymakers, by allowing inflation to rise or fall without limit, can keep the output
disequilibrium are equivalent, for then, by construction, p* + y* = P + y. If, instead, p*
is defined as the market-clearing price level given current aod expected future money
supplies, then one will not have y - y* = p* - p except if either the demand for money is
completely interest inelastic or the representative household's elasticity of intertemporal
substitution equals one. Details are given in an appendix.
, The determinaots of the price sensitivity parameter, is, are discussed below.
5market in permanent disequilibrium.
Unexpected changes in inflation need not imply any disturbance to output-market
equilibrium at all. From equation 1, a downward revision in firms' expectations of future
.prices will cause an instantaneous fall in the new-contract price, v. This fall will occur
.even if expectations of future z's are unchanged. In particular, it will occur even if the
output market is expected to remain in equilibrium. As noted above, 1T, = 8(v - p),--
hence an instantaneous fall in the new-contractprice will cause an equally sudden
disinflation. Finally, from equation 4, once inflation has dropped, maintaining the new
inflation rate does not require that there be any output-market disequilibrium. However,
maintaining the new inflation rate does require appropriate changes in monetary policy.
Ifmoney demand is to equal money supply, the growth rate of the latter must fall,
discontinuously, at the same time that inflation falls. Moreover, if the demand for
money is interest sensitive, the level of the money supply will have to jump upward,
discontinuously.
The McCallum Model. McCallum (1980) develops a discrete-time model in which firms'
match output to sales, setprice one period in advance, and face costs that are quadratic
in both the level and the change in the gap betWeen actual and potential output. He
derives a price-adjustment equation of the form
(5)
where y > O. An alternative version of equation 5 replaces the output gap, (y - y*),."
with a price gap, (p* - p),.\ (Grossman 1974, Barro & Grossman 1976, Mussa 1981a,b).
The continuous-time counterpart of equation 5 is
(6)
6where z, may represent either an output gap or a price gap and where 'IT*, denotes the
time derivative of the market-clearing price.' As in the Calvo model, the time path of
the price level is continuous, but the inflation rate can jump.
Note that equation 6 is similar to equation 3 in form, with 'IT*, taking the place of
vt • The connection between the Calvo and McCallum models is especially close in the
case where is = 1 and z, = pO, - p" for then equation 1 says that
(7)
Thus, in Calvo's model, inflation moves one-for-one with the rate of change of a
weighted average of expected future market-clearing prices. In McCallum's model,
inflation moves one-for-one with the rate of change in the current market-clearing price.
Because of the responsiveness of inflation to current market conditions in the
McCallum model, it is impossible for policy-makers to keep the output market in
permanent disequilibrium. This result is easiest to see in case where output-market
disequilibrium is written as a function of the price gap, for then equation 6 reduces to
Zt = -yZ t, which has as its solution Z, = zoe-". Thus, any initial disequilibrium is
eliminated at the constant rate y.'
According to equation 6, once a McCallum economy is in market-clearing
equilibrium, it will remain in equilibrium as long as 'IT* remains finite. Hence,
disinflations will involve no output loss provided the market-clearing price level does not
jump. Preventing a jump in the market-clearing price level may require that the money
supply vary discontinuously, since the demand for real balances will--assuming an
interest-elastic money demand--jump upward when a disinflationary policy is announced.
8 More generally, one might have 'IT, = E,_.('IT*, + yz,), where t:. 2!: O.
9 For discussion of the case in which disequilibrium is measured by the output gap,
see McCallum (1995) and Koenig (1990b).
7The Fuhrer-Moore Model. Fuhrer and Moore (1992) put forward a variant of the Calvo
model that is quite successful at mimicking the autocorrelation pattern of real-world
inflation. Equation 2 is retained, but equation 1 is replaced bylO
(8)
Differentiating equation 8 with respect to time yields "i\ = &[vt - (lI t + pzt )] at all
times, t, when no new information is arriving. As before, equation 2 implies '77', = 8(v, -
p,). Differentiate the latter expression and subtract it from the former to obtain
(9)
which is the counterpart of equation 3 in the Calvo model. It follows that
ll
(10)
Hence, it t cannot jump except in response to new information. The inflation rate itself
is continuous: any disinflation will necessarily be gradual.
Consider an economy making the transition to a new, lower inflation rate. In the
10 In a series of later papers, Fuhrer and Moore propose a slightly more complicated
variant of the Calvo model (Fuhrer and Moore 1995a,b). In equation 8, vt and '77', are
replaced by v, - v'", and p, - pm" respectively, where v'", is a weighted average of past new-
contract prices and pm, is a weighted average of past aggregate prices. The qualitative
properties of the two Fuhrer-Moore models are quite similar.
II In Fuhrer and Moore's alternative variant of the Calvo model (see previous note),
equation 10 is replaced by itt = -&P (&Zt + Zt).
8course of this transition, 1i: t must take on negative values, but cannot be bounded away
from zero from above." Hence, there must be intervals during the transition to lower
inflation in which 1i: t is rising. From equation 10, it follows that during disinflations
there must be intervals in which output falls short of potential.
As a specific example, suppose that policymakers want to gradually reduce
inflation from 7To > 0 to 0 according to 7T, = 7To e-", for some fixed>.. > O. Then
itt = >,,21toe-J.t > 0, and equation 9 implies z, = ->"'7To e-
lt/(8'fs) < O. In words, the
disinflation triggers a recession."
While the Fuhrer-Moore model rules out costless disinflations, it clearly violates
the natural rate hypothesis. In particular, a concave inflation path will keep output
above its market-clearing level, even if the inflation deceleration is fully anticipated.
Similarly, a convex inflation path will keep output below its market-clearing level. (See
equation 10.) Perhaps a more serious problem with the model is that its price
adjustment equation (eq. 8) has a weak underlying rationale."
A Generalized Fischer Model ofPrice Adjustment
The Model. Fischer (1977) analyzes the effectiveness of monetary policy in a world of
overlapping two-period labor contracts and rational expectations. Fischer's contracts--
" That is, the least upper bound on 1i: t is greater than or equal to zero.
" What time path of the money supply is needed to implement this policy? For
simplicity, suppose that the demand for money is interest inelastic--so that y, + p, = m,
= y*, + p*,--and that the market-clearing output level, y*, is constant. Then one must
have In, = y* + p*, = y* + p, - z, = y* + p, - f)'7Toe-8l/(8
2g), where p, = po + 7To (1 - e-
")/f). Thus, the money supply must drop discontinuously at t = 0, when the
disinflationary policy is first announced. The money supply then grows, at a decelerating
pace, asymptotically approaching y* + 7To/f).
" Fuhrer and Moore justify their pricing equation by asserting that workers are
concerned about their relative--not their absolute--real wages.
9unlike Taylor's--specify a wage path rather than a fixed wage level. Specifically, Fischer
assumes that the contract wage equals the expected market-clearing wage in each period,
where the expectation is conditional on information available at the time the contract
was negotiated. Here, I introduce Fischer-style contracts into an economy in which the
time until any given contract expires has an exponential distribution. Moreover, I relax
the assumption that the contract priee equals the expected market-clearing price. To
facilitate comparison with other contracting models, I apply the generalized Fischer
model to finished goods prices rather than to factor prices.
In an economy with Fischer-style price contracts, the analog to equations 1 and 2
is the single equation"
(11)
where, as before, z, is either the gap, y, - y*" between actual output and market-clearing
output or the gap, p*,- p" between an appropriately defined market-clearing aggfegate .
price level and the actual aggregate price level. Intuitively, firms will want to charge
more than the aggregate price if the aggregate price leaves excess demand for output
and to chargeless·than the aggregate price if the aggregate price results in excess supply.
Accordingly, firms that were.locked into contracts at time s < t will charge E,[p, + 15z,]
at time t. The aggregate price is simply the average of the prices chargedby firms with
different contract dates. It is completely pre-determined: while p, need not be
continuous with respect to time, it cannot jump in response to new information.
When z, = p*, - p, and 15 = 1 (as in Fischer's original specification), equation 11
says that the aggregate price level will be a weighted average of past expectations of the
current market-clearing price level.
" If new information is incorporated into contracts with a lag, then E,.•[o] replaces
E,[oj in the equations below.
10Differentiating equation 11 with respect to time, one obtains
(12)
where
Equation 12 is an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. It says that current inflation
will be high relative to an average of lagged expectations of current inflation if either
there is excess demand for output or people have been expecting rapid growth in current
excess demand. The dependence of inflation on expectations of current growth in excess
demand may explain.the so-called "speed effect," first noted by Phillips (1958).
Equation 12 is similar to equation 3 in the Calvo model. In both models,
inflation is an increasing function of excess demand in the output market. In the Calvo
model, inflation is also increasing in the growth rate of a weighted average of current
expectations offuture prices and excess demands. Here, inflation is instead an increasing
function of a weighted average oflagged expectations of current growth in the price level
and excess demand.
If f, equals 1 and z. is interpreted as a price gap, equation 12 reduces to
(15)
11which is closely analogous to the price adjustment equation favored by McCallum,
equation 6. Here, however, inflation is increasing in a weighted average of past
expectations of current growth in the market-clearing price. In the McCallum model,
inflation is increasing in actual current growth in the market-clearing price.
In the absence ofsurprises, 1& ~ = 1& t and zt = Zt. Equation 12 reduces to
zt = -5Z t, which has >; = Zoe'" as its unique convergent solution. Thus, any initial
disequilibrium is eliminated at the constant rate 8: in a world of Fischerian contracts, it
is impossible for policyrnakers to keep the output market in permanent disequilibrium.
This result suggests that Fischer contracts are robust to a wider range of monetary
policies than are Calvo contracts.
Surprise reductions in inflation are inevitably costly in a Fischerian world.
Consider an economy that has been--and is expected to remain--in market-clearing
equilibrium. Suddenly, at t = 0, a disinflationary policy is announced: From equations
13 and 14, neither 1&~ nor zoe can jump in response to the announcement. From equa-
tion 12, it then follows that any decline in 1To due to the new policy must be accompanied
by excess supply in the output market. Further details are presented below.
The Detenninants of the Price-Sensitivity Parameter. In a model ofmonopolistically-
competitive, utility-maximizing producer-consumers, Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp.
376-80) derive a formula for agent i's optimal price, taking the prices charged by other




where P" P, and p* denote the price charged by agent i, the average price level, and the
market-clearing price level, respectively; where () > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between products; and where b ;;, 0 is the elasticity of the marginal disutility ofwork
12with respect to output. (As such, b captures both the rising marginal disutility of work
and the decreasing marginal productivity of labor.) After taking logarithms, one has
Pi - P = P(p' - p)
with 15 = b/(l + Ob) 2: O. Consistent with the discussion accompanying equation (11),
those agents who have the ability to adjust their prices in the current period do not
typically move directly to the market-clearing price. Only a fraction of the price gap is
closed. This fraction is larger the more difficult it is for agents to expand production
(the larger is b) and the less competitive is the output market (the smaller is 0)."
One can obtain some sense of the likely magnitude of 15 from empirical estimates
of the Phillips curve. When inflation is regressed on lagged values of itself and a
measure of the gap between actual and potential GDP, the output gap is typically
estimated to have a coefficient of about .18.
17
,18 Equation 12 suggests that this gap
coefficient should equal the product of 15 and the contract renegotiation rate, a. Hence,
ifa = .69 (implying that 50% of firms reset their price paths in a year or less), then 15 =
.26. Ifa = 3 (implying that 95% of firms reset their price paths in a.year or less), then 15
16 That increased competition is associated with greater price inflexibility is
emphasized by Nishimura (1992). It is competition between firms whose contracts are
expiring and those whose contracts remain in force that prevents the former firms from
charging a price that deviates very far from the average price.
17 Hoeller and Poret (1991) obtain this estimate, which is bracketed by the .21
if estimate of Hallman, Porter, and Small (1991) and the .16 estimate of Ebrill and Fries
'(1991).
1. When the output gap is replaced with the Hallman-Porter-Small (1991) measure
of the gap between the long-run equilibrium and current price levels, the coefficient of
this price gap lies between .07 and .22. The high figure is due to Hallman, Porter, and
Small. Hoeller and Poret (1991) obtain estimates of .07 and .12 depending on the meth-
od for estimating potential output (which is one of the ingredients needed for calculating
p*). Similarly, Christiano (1989) reports price-gap coefficient estimates of .08 and .13,
after annualization, while Ebrill and Fries (1991) report a price-gap coefficient of .14.
13= .06. More generally, for any reasonable assumption about the frequency of contract
renegotiation, it turns out that IS must be quite small to be consistent with the data.
Turning this around, large values of IS imply highly unrealistic contract renegotiation
frequencies. (For example, setting IS = 1 implies that only 16.5% of firms reevaluate
._their pricing each year.) Apparently, the typical firm prefers to stay fairly close to the
prevailing average price level.
Solving the Model. It is possible to solve for the path of the output gap (or, more
generally, the price gap) without specifying the demand side of the economy. As above,
consider an economy that is in market-clearing equilibrium and that is expected to
remain in market-clearing equilibrium indefinitely. Suddenly, at t = 0, a new monetary
policy is announced. The change in policy will be treated as a complete surprise and
completely credible: both before and after time zero, I will assume that there is no
uncertainty about policy or the economy's response to policy. Two alternative solution
strategies are available. One strategy is to assume that policymakers choose actions
designed to .achieve a desired path of the price level. The other strategy is to take the
path of the market-clearing price, p*, as given. In either case, once the model is
expanded to include a specification of aggregate demand, one can find the path of the
money supply required by the new policy, along with the associated interest rate path.
Under the above assumptions, equation 12 becomes
1& = lI~z + lifO 11 e~(s- <Ids + II rt (1& + ~z) e~(s- tlds (1.6)
t t -(00 t Jott'
for t <:: O. Here a bar over a variable denotes the value that people had expected prior
to the announcement of the new policy. After evaluating the integrals, and rearranging
terms, equation 16 reduces to
14(17a)
or, since one can always write z, = p*, - p, for a suitably defined p*, (c.f. note #6),
(17b)
The solution to the first of these differential equations takes the form
(18a)
while the solution to the second equation is
(18b)
Perfect price flexibility is achieved in the limit as a~ 00.
Equation 18a gives the path of the market-dearing price level implied by a given
desired path of the actual price level. Equation 18b gives the path of the actual price
level implied by a given path of the market-dearing price level. One can use these
equations to illustrate the difference between price adjustment in an economy with
Fischer contracts and price adjustment in economies with McCallum or Fuhrer-Moore
contracts.
Consider, first, the difference between price adjustment under Fischer contracts
and price adjustment under Fuhrer-Moore contracts. Suppose that the economy is
initially in market-dearing equilibrium with a 5% annual inflation rate. Suddenly,
policymakers decide they want to reduce inflation to zero. In the notation of equation
1518a, P t - P t = a for t < 0 and P t - P t = -. 05 t for t ;;, O. With Fuhrer-Moore
contracts an immediate move to zero inflation is out of the question: inflation is neces-
sarily continuous (c.f. equation 10). With Fischer contracts, an immediate disinflation is
perfectly feasible: the monetary authority need only engineer a suitably large,
discontinuous fall in the market-clearing price level. Figure 1 displays two examples--one
for the case in which 95% of contracts are renegotiated each year and one for the case
in which 50% of contracts are renegotiated each year." The bottom line is that inflation
is less persistent under Fischer contracts than under Fuhrer-Moore contracts.
A similar exercise illustrates the difference between price adjustment under
Fischer contracts and price adjustment under McCallum contracts. Again, suppose that
the economy is initially in market-clearing equilibrium with constant, 5% inflation.
Suddenly, the monetary authority lowers the market-clearing inflation rate to zero. (In
eq. 18b, P; - P t = a for t < 0 and P; - P t = -. 05 t for t ;;, 0.) With McCallum
contracts, the actual inflation rate also falls immediately to zero. The economy remains
in market-clearing equilibrium (c.f. equation 6). With Fischer contracts, equation 18b
implies price and inflation paths like those displayed in Figure 2. The actual price level
overshoots the market-clearing price level, so that the inflation rate falls only gradually,
and eventually approaches zero from below. Clearly, inflation is more persistent, in
response to unanticipated changes in policy, under Fischer contracts than under
McCallum contracts.
Aggregate Demand in an Economy with Fischer Contracts
Ao aggregate demand specification is essential if one is to find the money supply
and interest rate paths associated with a given price path. This section begins by laying
out a simple, illustrative model of aggregate demand. It then derives the money supply
and interest rate paths associated with the disinflations depicted in Figures 1 and 2.
" In each case, the renegotiation frequency and price sensitivity parameters satisfy
the equation fS8 = .18.
16Aggregate Demand. The model of aggregate demand used throughout this section
consists of a money demand equation and an optimality condition for allocating
consumption through time. Specifically, I assume that the consumption-velocity of
money is increasing in the nominal interest rate:
(19)
where C, and m, are the logarithms of real consumption and nominal money, respectively,
R, is the nominal interest rate, and a ~ 0 is a fixed parameter. Consumption adjusts
according to
(20)
where r, is the real interest rate and a, p ~ 0 are fixed parameters. Equation 20 is
simply the Euler equation for an infinitely-lived representative agent with rate of time
preference p and elasticity of intertemporal substitution a.'"
Equations 19 and 20 will be assumed to hold at all times, t, when no new
information is arriving, regardless ofwhether or not the output market clears. These
equations can be used in conjunction with equation 18a or 18b to find the money-supply
and interest-rate paths associated with a given monetary policy. Two examples follow.
Throughout, I assume that Z, equals the gap, c, - c*" between the current and the market-
clearing rates of consumption. Equivalently, z, = p*, - p" where p*, is defined as the
price level consistent with market clearing, given the current rate of nominal consumer
'" For simplicity, I assume that the marginal utility of consumption is independent of
real money balances. Estimation results presented in Koenig (1990a) suggest that a
relaxation of this assumption may be worth exploring.
17spending." Moreover, I assume that the economy is initially operating at potential, with
inflation constant at rate 1t. At t = 0 a new monetary policy is announced and
implemented. The announcement is completely credible. Finally, for simplicity I assume
that potential consumption is constant through time.
Calibration. In the simulations presented below, equation 19 is used to find the time
path of the money supply needed to achieve a given desired path for the price level or
the level of nominal spending. It is the least important equation in the model in the
sense that it is not invoked until after the time paths of consumption, prices, and interest
rates have already been determined. Empirically, equation 19 fails to capture some of
the short-run dynamics of the money-consumption-interest rate relationship, but does a
fairly good job of explaining long-run co-movements in these variables. For the M1
monetary aggregate, Lucas (1988) reports interest semi-elasticities of 7 and 9 over 1958-
85 and 1900-85 sample periods, respectively. I set a equal to 8.
Equation 20 is one of the more empirically troublesome relationships in modern
dynamic macroeconomic theory, especially at short horizons. Estimates using aggregate
quarterly data typically find that the elasticity of intertemporal.substitution (a) is quite
low (about 0.1), and reject the model's overidentifying restrictions.'" More encouraging
results have recently been reported by analyst.s using panel data. Attanasio and Weber
(1994) find that a = 0.55, and fail to reject the overidentifying restrictions. Beaudry and
Van Wincoop (1996) obtain estimates ofa that are close to 1. Inview of these disparate
results, I report simulation results for all three values of the elasticity of intertemporal
" So p', == (c, + p,) - c',. See note #6, above. An alternative definition of P',--as
the price level consistent with market clearing given the current and future levels of the
money supply--is explored in the appendix.
22 See Hall (1988). Cochrane (1989) argues that, nevertheless, the equation is a
good approximation. Attempting to improve its aggregate performance, Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) modify equation 20 to allow some fixed fraction of consumers to rigidly
link their consumption to current income. Other researchers have suggested that the
equation be modified to incorporate habit formation (Constantinides 1990).
18substitution whenever the path of output is sensitive to a. (Otherwise, I assume a =
0.55.) I set the rate of time preference, p, equal to .025.
Policy Shock #1: A Sudden Disinflation. Suppose that the monetary authority wishes to
engineer an immediate, surprise disinflation. Since p*, - p, = z. = Co - c*" equation 18a
determines both the required path of the market-clearing price and the associated path
of the output gap. With output determined, equation 20 determines the path of the real
interest rate. Together, the real interest rate and inflation determine the nominal
interest rate. Finally, equation 19 determines the money supply path needed to generate
the desired price path. Specifically, one has Z t = 0, r t = p, R t = p + 1& and
mt - P t = c' - a (p + 1&) for t < 0, while
Rt =It + 1& t = P +
"1t[1 + e 6t(lit - 1)]
a~(e6t-1)2
"1t[1 + e 6t(lit - 1)]
a~(eH-1)2
,
1& [t + a [1 + e H (Ii t - 1)]
6 6],
~(et-1) a(e t -1)
for t ~ O. Using L'Hospital's rule, one can show that
19_. 11(1 al roo - Po - c - ap - If "K + 20 .
As previously noted, a sudden disinflation is accompanied by a recession. The
recession will be milder (Zo will be smaller in magnitude) the more sensitive is each
firm's pricing to market disequilibrium (the larger is is). An increase in the mean
frequency with which contracts come up for renegotiation (an increase in 8)is
unambiguously stabilizing: it leads both to a milder recession and a speedier recovery.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (a), on the other hand, is completely
irrelevant to the time path of output.
The patterns of interest rate and money supply movement that the model predicts
will be associated with a disinflationary policy are in line with the conventional wisdom.
Thus, the real interest rate rises when the new policy goes into effect, and the nominal
yield curve becomes inverted. As long as aiS < 1/2--a condition that our calibration
exercises suggest is very likely to be met in practice--the short-term nominal interest rate
jumps upward and the money supply jumps downward. For given values of a and is, the
magnitude of the initial jump in short-term real and nominal interest rates is completely
independent of the frequency of contract renegotiation.
Figure 3 illustrates the responses of consumption, the nominal interest rate, and
the money supply to the immediate elimination of a 5% annual inflation." In the
simulations, the interest semi-elasticity of money demand (a) is fixed at 8.0, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (a) is fixed at .55, and the product of the contract
renegotiation rate (8) and the price sensitivity parameter (is) is fixed at .18. Two
alternative values of the renegotiation rate are considered. The first, 8 = 3.0, implies
" The consumption and money supply panels plot log deviations from pre-shock
values.
20that 95% of contracts are renegotiated within one year. The second, 8 = .69, implies
that only 50% of contracts are renegotiated each year.
Consumption falls precipitously in response to the sudden disinflation, declining
nearly 25% relative to its pre-shock level. The nominal interest rate rises from 7.5% to
20% (if 8 = .69) or 78% (if 8 = 3.0). The larger the upward jump in the nominal
interest rate, the larger is the initial required cut in the money supply: with 8 = .69, the
money supply must fall to 28% of its pre-shock level, while with 8 = 3.0, the money
supply must fall to less than 0.3% of its pre-shock level. Obviously, although a cold-
turkey disinflation of this magnitude is theoretically feasible in a world of Fischerian
contracts, the implications of such a policy for the economy are extreme."
Policy Shock #2: A Sudden Deceleration of Nominal Spending. Rather than engineer
an immediate reduction in inflation, suppose that the monetary authority suddenly (and
unexpectedly) reduces the growth rate of nominal spending. What are the consequences
for an economy with Fischerian price adjustment? Given our assumptions that p', - p, '"
z, = c, - c*. and that c*. is constant, a sudden reduction in the rate of nominal spending
growth is equivalent to a sudden reduction in the growth rate of p',--the experiment
illustrated in Figure 2. In an economy with McCallum-style price adjustment, this policy
would have no output effects. In an economy with Fischer-style adjustment, the output
gap is given by equation 18b: it is the mirror image of the price gap in Figure 2. As in
the analysis of Policy Shock #1, equation 20 determines the path of the real interest
rate; the real interest rate and inflation determine the nominal interest rate; and, finally,
equation 19 determines the money supply path needed to achieve the desired spending
deceleration. For t ~ 0 one now has
" The initial interest-rate and money-supply jumps become somewhat more
moderate at higher values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. With a = 1, for
example, the nominal interest rate jumps upward from 7.5% to 41.7% if is = .06 and to
only 9.6% if is = .26. Similarly, the money supply must be cut to 4% of its pre-shock
level if is = .06 and to 52% of its pre-shock level if is = .26.
21-1t t z =
t 1 + 13 (e H - 1)
"it[1 + !3(eH -1) - !3l1te&t]
a[1+!3(eH -1)P
(1 - a)"it[l + !3 (eH - 1) - ~lIteH]
a [1 + P(e&t - 1)P
m - p = c' - ap _ 1t [t + a (l-a) [1 + !3 (eH -l)- !3l1te&t]]
t t 1+!3(e&L1) a[1+!3(e&L1)]
The output, interest rate, and money supplyimplications of eliminating a 5%
annual increase in nominal spending are depicted in Figure 4 for the same parameter
combinations that were examined in Figure 3. The gradual initial declines in
consumption shown in the top panelof Figure 4 contrast with the discontinuous declines
observed in the top panel of Figure 3. The fall in consumption is both deeper and more
sustained the less frequently are contracts renegotiated. When 95% of contracts are
. renegotiated within oneyear (8 = 3), forexample, consumption troughs 10 months after
the new policy goes into effect, at which point consumption is 2.5% below potential.
Recovery is not 90% complete until 17 months later. When only 50% of contracts are
renegotiated within one year (8 = .69), the economy doesn't hit bottom for 27 months,
when consumption is fully 5.7% below potential. Recovery takes almost an additional 6
years. So, combined, recession and recovery take over 2 years when 8 = 3 and just over
8 years when 8 = .69.
Real and nominal interest rates initially fall in response to the sudden
deceleration of spending. Thereafter, movements in interest rates either mimic (a < 1)
or mirror (a > 1) those in the growth rate of real output. In the middle panel of Figure
4, with a = .55, the nominal interest rate is actually predicted to become negative in the
months immediately following implementation of the disinflationary policy. A negative
22nominal interest rate is a practical impossibility, of course. The implication is that an
immediate, 5-percentage-point spending deceleration is not feasible except if the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is above .55."
Money moves opposite to the nominal interest rate. In particular, the money
supply must jump upward, discontinuously, at the time the new spending policy is
announced. As illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 4, this upward jump can be
quite large, potentially creating a credibility problem for the monetary authority.
Fischer Contracts and the Taylor Rule
General Discussion. While Figures 3 and 4 are useful for illustrating important
differences between Fischer contracts and other contracting models, the policies
considered are extreme in their implications for output, interest rates, and the money
supply. An interesting and realistic alternative policy assumption is that the monetary
authority adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate in response to movements in
inflation and the output gap; as suggested by Taylor (1985). Taylor argues that an
interest-rate reaction function of the form
--where r denotes the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, v > 0 is a fixed
parameter, and ft is the target long-run inflation rate--has desirable stabilization
properties and fairly accurately describes actual Federal Reserve behavior. One can
" The initial post-shock interest rate is p - (1 - a)'it. It follows that an
a
instantaneous spending deceleration of size Tiwill be feasible if and only if a 2: _..;.:11:_
P + 11:
Equivalently, the largest feasible instantaneous spending deceleration is 1 pa .
- a
23enhance the descriptive realism of the Taylor rule by making allowance for the Federal
Reserve's propensity to smooth short-term interest rates. As shown in Koenig (in
preparation) a reaction function of the form
(21)
does well empirically. For the United States, estimates of equation 21 indicate that y ""
2 and V"".75.
Equations 18a, 20, and 21 can be combined to yield a system of two first-order
differential equations in the output gap and the nominal interest rate:"
Zt = ( 0 ) [R P 1t - fllle6tz t ]
1 + po (e6t _ 1) t - - t'
Rt = ( y ) [(1 + v)1t + [vpo(eH - 1) - 1] (Rt - p)
1 + po (e6t - 1)
(22)
(23)
These equations can be solved numerically. Equation 19 then yields the time-path of
money balances.
Policy Simulations. Figures 5, 6, and Tillustrate how the economy responds to a sudden
reduction in the monetary authority's long-run inflation target (it), from 5% to 0% per
year. The new policy is announced at t = 0, which is also when the simulations begin.
As suggested by existing Phillips curve estimates, the product (:fS8) of the price-sensitivity
,. In deriving equations 22 and 23, I assume that the target long-run inflation rate is
oand that potential output is constant. It follows that r = p.
24and renegotiation-frequency parameters is set equal to .18. The simulations in Figure 5
assume that 75% of contracts are renegotiated each year, while those in Figures 6 and 7
assume that 50% and 95% of contracts are renegotiated each year, respectively. The
different panels within each figure illustrate the effect of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, a, on the behavior of the economy.
Qualitatively, the responses depicted in Figures 5A-C are roughly in line with
policy practitioners' conventional wisdom. The monetary authority's new, tougher anti-
inflation stance is initially marked by a cut in the money supply and--except for large
values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution--an increase in the short-term nom-
inal interest rate. Thus, the "liquidity effect" is no puzzle in the context of this model.
Even though three fourths of all contracts are renegotiated each year, inflation falls
slowly: it takes over three years for inflation to drop below 1%. Moreover, the fight
against inflation is costly: consumption initially falls by 1.1-to-3.6% relative to potential,
and over four years are required for 90% of the consumption gap to be eliminated.
Eventually the nominal interest rate approaches a new, lower steady-state level. The
money supply must rise to accommodate the resultant increase in money demand.
One criticism of the Taylor rule is that it fails to provide a nominal anchor for the
economy. In particular, there is no effort to offset past deviations from the long-run
inflation target. This tendency to "let bygones be bygones" is evident in Figure 5D, which
shows that the Taylor rule allows the price level to drift upward from its pre-shock level.
A policy of immediate disinflation would allow no such drift, of course, and the nominal
spending policy illustrated in Figures 2 and 4 allows only a temporary price deviation.
Figures 6A-D demonstrate that a reduction in the frequency of contract
renegotiation (while holding B3 constant) has little effect on the qualitative pattern of
the economy's response to a reduction in the long-run inflation target, but substantially
deepens the recession that follows implementation of the new policy and substantially
slows the economy's convergence to its new equilibrium. With only 50% of contracts
renegotiated each year, it takes 6-to-8 years for inflation to fall below 1%, and over 7.5
years for 90% of the initial consumption gap to be eliminated.
Conversely, an increase in the frequency of contract renegotiation reduces the
25impact effect of disinflationary policy and speeds the economy's convergence. In Figure
7, where 95% of contracts are renegotiated within 1 year, it takes under 2 years for the
annualized inflation rate to fall from 5% to I%. Less than 2.5 years are required for
90% of the initial consumption gap to be eliminated.
Sacrifice Ratios
The sacrifice ratio gives the cumulative percentage reduction in output required to
lower inflation by one percentage point. Table 1 presents sacrifice ratios for a sudden
disinflation, a sudden deceleration in nominal spending, and a sudden cut in the Taylor
inflation target.Z7 Parameter values are the same as those used in the simulation
exercises. (In particular, B8 = .18 throughout.) Note that for each policy, the sacrifice
ratio varies inversely with the frequency of contract renegotiation (8). Also, the sacrifice
. .
ratio is increasing in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (a) whenthe monetary
authority follows the Taylor rule. Regardless of the values of 8 and a, the sacrifice ratios
associated with a deceleration of nominal spending are lower than the ratios associated
with an immediate disinflation. Except when both the renegotiation frequency and the
elasticity ofintertemporal substitUtion are high, the spending rule is, in tUrn,
outperformed by the Taylor rule.
Z7 In the tables, output losses are discounted at a 2.5 percent annual rate.
26Table 1. Sacrifice Ratios for Various DisinOationary Policies
Price Sensitivity/Renegotiation Frequen«r
IS = 06 I) = 300 IS = 13 I) = 139 IS = 26 8 = 69 , , ,
Inunediate 3.24 6.61 12.84
Disinflation
Nominal Spending 0.62 1.88 4.86
Deceleration
Taylor Rule: a=.1 0.19 0.55 1.45
Taylor Rule: a=.55 0.50 1.22 2.69
Taylor Rule: a=1 0.64 1.45 3.00
Gordon (1985) reports that most real-world estimates of the sacrifice ratio lie
. between 3 and 10.'" For a permanent, "cold turkey," 5-percentage-point reduction in
nominal GNP growth (the experiment analyzed in row 2 of Table 1) he calculates a
sacrifice ratio of 7.5. At first glance, most of the entries in Table 1 seem umealistically
low. Keep in mind, however, that we have excluded the most volatile components of
output (business and residential investment, consumer durables) from our model. Given
that output is twice as variable as nondurables and services consumption at business-
cycle frequencies (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1996), the entries in Table 1 ought to be
doubled before they are compared with Gordon's figures. Moreover, we have abstracted
from the credibility issue in our analysis.'" All things considered, the Fischer contracting
model is fairly successful at generating realistic sacrifice ratios provided that no more
than three fourths of firms reevaluate their pricing each year (8 ::; 1.39).
'" Ball's estimated sacrifice ratios are much lower, ranging from 0.0 to 3.6 and
averaging 1.4. See Ball (1994).
'" Ifthe new, disinf1ationary policy only gradually becomes credible, consumption
would likely fall more slowly and fall farther than in the simulations presented here--
increasing the sacrifice ratio and giving the consumption path more of an inverted
"humped shape." In an economy with inventories, the decline in output would likely be
even more gradual than the decline in consumption.
27Concluding Remarks
Both for determining how price stickiness affects the economy's dynamic response
to shocks and for assessing the empirical importance of price stickiness as a propagation
.mechanism for monetary policy, it is useful to have a price adjustment model that
permits the degree of price flexibility to vary continuously over a range ofvalues.
Unfortunately, existing price-adjustment models with this feature are unsatisfactory along
one or more dimensions. Thus, Calvo's version of the Taylor contracting model has the
implication that disinflationary policies need not be associated with recessions and,
indeed, may trigger booms. Moreover, in the Calvo model it is possible to find monetary
policies that keep output permanently away from its market-clearing level. McCallum's
price adjustment model eliminates the latter problem but retains the former. Fuhrer and
Moore's model eliminates the former problem but retains the latter. Moreover, the
Fuhrer-Moore model lacks a convincing rationale.
This paper has developed a generalized, continuous-time version of Fischer's
model of overlapping contracts. The Fischer model is distinguished from those of
Taylor, Calvo, and Fuhrer and Moore in that contracts specify a price path rather than a
fixed price level. The intuition is that the costs of renegotiating contracts and gathering
information on market conditions are likely to be large relative to the costs of changing
prices per se. The Fischer contracting specification introduces sufficient additional price
flexibility that there is no longer any monetary policy that will keep output permanently
away from its market-clearing level. Nevertheless, prices are sufficiently rigid that any
disinflation that is not fully anticipated and fully credible triggers a recession.
The generalized Fischer modelis analytically tractable. It implies.an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve with a built in speed effect. When combined with
a money demand schedule and a rule for allocating consumption through time, the
model can be used to find the monetary policy needed to achieve a given price or
spending path, and to find the price path implied by a given monetary policy. Analyses
of three alternative disinflationary policies demonstrate the importance of having a
framework in which price stickiness is not an "all or nothing" proposition. In these
28examples, the economy's response to a policy shock changes substantially--both
quantitatively and qualitatively--depending upon the frequency with which contracts are
renegotiated and the sensitivity of contract prices to output market disequilibrium. The
examples also serve to illustrate that monetary-policy-induced fluctuations in output can
be quite pronounced and quite persistent even when contracts are renegotiated
frequently.
In future work, it would be desirable to seek more precise estimates of the
parameters of the Fischer model. There is also certainly room for exploring the
implications alternative aggregate demand specifications, stochastic shocks, and imperfect
policy credibility. Preliminary results (not presented here) suggest that an aggregate
demand specification that includes durable goods expenditures would be particularly
worthwhile. Finally, the current analysis treats the mean rate at which contracts come up
for renegotiation as a fixed parameter. This assumption may be reasonable during
periods in which the inflation process is fairly stable, but seems certain to break down
for sufficiently large policy shocks or sufficiently sustained changes in inflation
uncertainty (Ireland 1996).
29Appendix: The Relationship Between the Price-Gap and Output-Gap Models ofPrice
Adjustment--An Example
Throughout the main body of this paper, it is assumed that firms adjust their
prices in response to expected disequilibrium between actual and potential output.. This
is the output-gap model of price adjustment. As noted in the discussion of the Calvo
model, a more general specification has firms adjust their prices in response to the
expected gap between the market-dearing aggregate price level and the actual current
aggregate price leveL This "price-gap" specification is incomplete, however, without a
definition of "the market-dearing price leveL" For example, the output-gap model is that
special case of the price-gap model in which the market-dearing price, p'" is defined as
the price level that would prevail if output equaled potential output, given the current
. '.
rate of nominal spending. This appendix briefly explores analtemative definition ofp'"
as that price level consistent with market-dearing given the current level and future path
of the money supply."
Ifthe current level and future path of the money supply are taken as given, it




30 Hallman, Porter, and Small (1991) take yet another approach. They define p' as
the price level that would prevail, given the current money supply, if output equaled
potential output and the nominal interest rate was at its long-run average leveL
30where c', r', and i' denote the market-clearing levels of consumption, the real rate of
interest, and the nominal rate of interest, respectively, But i = r + 71', so equations A.l
and A2 can be combined to yield
(A.3)
When a = 0, so that the demand for money is interest inelastic, fixing the current money
supply is equivalent to fixing the current level of nominal spending. We know that the
output-gap and price-gap models ofprice adjustment are equivalent in this case. Sure
enough, with a = 0 equation A3 reduces to (c, - c',) = -(p, - p',), If, however, a > 0,
the solution to equation A.3 is
(1 - 0) f~ z e-(a/a) (5 - t)ds] ,
a; t 5
(A.4)
where x ;: c - c' is the output gap and z ;: p' - P is minus the price gap." In general, the
output gap depends on a weighted average of expected future price gaps as well as the
current price gap. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than 1, high
future prices have a depressing effect on current demand, just as does a high current
price level. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than 1, high
future prices have a positive effect on current demand, When utility is logarithmic (u =
1), we're back in the case where the output and price gaps are equal, apart from sign.
" Alternatively, equation A.3 can be solved for the price gap as a function of current
and expected future output gaps. One obtains
.2: [x + (0 - 1) f~ x e-(5 - tJ/ads] .
o t a; t 5
31To understand what makes the case in which utility is logarithmic special, note
that with a = 1 equations 19 and 20 imply
IA.5)
where nt is the level of nominal spending at time t. The solution to equation A.S is
IA.6)
Thus, with a = 1 the future path of the money supply completely determines the current
rate of nominal spending. We know, however, that the output-gap and price-gap models
of price adjustment are equivalent if the current rate of nominal spending is held fixed
when defining the market-clearing price.
We can combine our aggregate demand relationship (equation A4), with either of
equations 18a and 18b to obtain a formula for the output gap as a function of the actual
price level relative to the previously expected price level (pt - Pt) or as a function of
the market-clearing price level relative to the previously expected price level (p; - Pt):
x = ~[Pt -Pt + 1 - Of 00 Ps -Ps e-(o/.)(s-t)ds]
t 13 e 6t - 1 IX t e lis - 1
IA.7a)
* Pt - Pt
X = 0 [ ----'::-=-:-----.:--"---,--
t 1 + 13 (elit - 1)
*
+ 1 - Of 00 _---'P;C-s':---iP~s--,-- e-(o/.)(s-t)ds].
0: t l+13(eIiS -l)
IA.7b)
These two equations can be used in conjunction with equations A1 and A2 to fully
characterize the economy's response to policy shocks.
32o
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